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THE FAILURE OF INVESTOR PROTECTION BY DISCLOSURE
Tamar Frankel

This Article deals with the issue of investor protection by disclosure. It
discusses the evolution of disclosure in the financial area during the
past thirty years, the role of disclosure in the regulation of
intermediaries, and the current strong disagreements concerning the
Dodd–Frank Act’s mandate applicable to market brokers. The Article
notes the role of disclosure in the restructured financial intermediation
system, its failure to protect investors, and concludes with suggestions to
partially correct the failure and restore the rationale for effective
disclosure. Disclosure should apply to the risks posed by the
intermediaries rather than to the dangers and risks posed by the
investments that the intermediaries offer.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article deals with an old issue in the context of a new
environment, that is, disclosure to investors in the context of the
evolving financial system. The new environment relates to trading in
securities and other innovative and novel financial instruments.
Financial instruments involve promises. One party, a saver, offers
money to another, a borrower. The borrower promises to repay the
saver and an additional amount to cover the saver’s risks and loss of
alternative financial gains from the lent amount. The more complex the
conditions of the arrangement become, the more complex the promising
party is (e.g., a large pool of various borrowers providing various
mortgages), the more reliance and trust the transaction involves on the
part of the saver. Trust and reliance are required of any dealings
between two parties. Yet, promises of future payments by unknown and
unknowable borrowers may involve a higher level of trust. Even if
known, borrowers pose a risk whether they are individuals, who may
lose their assets or their jobs, or corporations and other entities that may
lose their business or legitimacy.
This Article addresses the legal requirements of disclosure aimed at
informing investors (savers) about the investments they are offered and
designed to help them determine whether to buy or sell the borrowers’
promises. In the 1930s, Congress established a legal requirement to
inform investors about the borrowers’ promises. During the past thirty
years, this requirement has undergone significant changes. The recent
legislation of the Dodd–Frank Act addressed disclosures once more.
After the Act was passed, the implementation of some of the disclosure
requirements has currently been subject to strong and sometimes
passionate disagreements. On a very fundamental level—and some
would say the highest level—is this question: when and under what
circumstances must one party to a negotiation or a relationship disclose
to another particular facts, and who and how are these facts to be
disclosed? This question is discussed in Part II of this Article.
Part III of the Article examines the role of disclosure in the context of
two main forms of intermediation in our financial systems. One form is
institutional intermediation, such as the intermediation by banks and
insurance companies. The other form is market intermediation by
underwriters, brokers, and dealers. This Part addresses the different
regulatory regimes regulating the intermediaries and the process. In
addition, this Part follows the slow merger of the two structures, and the
role disclosure played in each of these structures.
We note that in the United States market intermediation was, and
continues to be, grounded in disclosure; institutional intermediation was
based on substantive regulation and substantive fiduciary law. This type
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of regulation has increasingly been watered down and substituted by
disclosure. In part, this process was caused by the merger of the two
intermediation forms and brought about a heightened emphasis on
disclosure.
Part IV discusses the legal roots and rationale, advantages and flaws
of the disclosure requirement for investors–savers about the terms of the
borrowers’ promises. In this Part, we note the failure of disclosure to
achieve its objective and the reasons for the failure such as (1) the
complexity of the financial promises for which investors–savers pay, (2)
the copious disclaimers of the issuers as protection from prosecution,
and (3) the drive of the issuers and salespersons to emphasize the
promised gain and de-emphasize the risk of loss posed by these financial
promises. We note the disastrous failure of disclosure to produce the
anticipated results, regardless of the type of intermediaries that were
required to apply it. After all, communications among humans are
complicated.1
Part V concludes by suggesting a partial correction for the failure of
disclosure. In the current environment, there is an overwhelming drive
for innovations and the adoption of innovation by the financial
intermediaries. Explaining the promises for which investors–savers pay
cash in the hope of gaining more has become ineffective. Even the
purchase of such promises is no longer simple. There developed an
entire community that invents and models new promises that must
explain its own innovations. In short, understanding the promises and
their effect on the savers who buy these promises has become a
profession. Teaching buyers and sellers whose expertise lies elsewhere
to become “educated” in this science is tremendously wasteful for
society.
Therefore, in this day and age, disclosure about securities and
transactions in securities must relate not to the nature of the securities,
but to the reliability of the intermediaries and the innovators that
produce these securities—whoever produces them. These experts
know—or should know—what they are innovating, offering, or
benefitting from.
The time when this country and any other country had “sophisticated
investors” is over. Because the interests of intermediaries may compete
with the interests of the investors–savers, these investors–savers must
understand what disclosure they need and what disclosures they can
understand.
Because conflicting interests are far easier to understand than the
1. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (D.F. Pears & B.F.
McGuinness trans., 1974); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1967).
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complex instruments which are being offered, the information about
conflicts of interests can help investors determine which innovation is
reliable. Disclosure must move from what is being sold to who is
selling it.
II. WHEN AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES MUST A PARTY TO A
RELATIONSHIP DISCLOSE TO THE OTHER PARTY CERTAIN FACTS?
Law deals extensively with the role of disclosure by the parties to a
variety of interactions both personal and public. This Part will first
address disclosure between parties in a contractual relationship. Second,
this Part will discuss disclosure within a fiduciary relationship. Finally,
this Part will discuss disclosure in the markets.
A. Disclosure: The Contract Model
The base line of contract duty of disclosure is that no party is required
to disclose any facts to the other. Each party may, however, demand
information from the other. And once the other agrees to provide the
information, the other party must tell the truth. If it does not tell the
truth, the law provides the other party, and sometimes the society, with
remedies and punishments.
This model is based on the assumption that both parties are more or
less equally able to seek the necessary information for making its
decisions. In addition, the model is based on the assumption that each
party understands that the other’s interests may conflict on some
particulars with its own (e.g., price) as well as that the parties have
shared interest to interact (to trade).
B. Disclosure: The Fiduciary Model
Intermediaries may be contract parties, exchanging securities with
their customers. However, intermediaries may play various roles for
investors–savers. Intermediaries may serve as trustees who manage the
investors–savers money and finances, or as brokers who sell and advise
investors–savers, or as advisers to investors–savers. To perform these
services, intermediaries must be entrusted with discretion or money, or
both.
In most of these cases the roles of the parties change, regardless of
how educated the investors–savers are. In all these cases the investors–
savers must entrust to the intermediaries either their securities, other
property, cash, or the power to determine whether to buy, sell, or hold
obligors’ promises.
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The more control intermediaries have over the investors’ money and
the greater the intermediaries’ power to determine the investments, the
higher the investors’ risk is that the intermediaries will be tempted to use
the money, securities, or power for other than the investors–savers’ sole
interest. The more the investors control either the entrusted money or
power, the lower their risk would be. However, in situations in which
control is impossible or for other reasons reliance by investors on
intermediaries is necessary, the possibility of control is reduced. If
control can and is exercised, however, the relationship becomes far less
efficient.2
Therefore, depending on the nature and level of the entrustors’ risks
from misappropriation by intermediaries and on the ability and
rationality of entrustors’ control to prevent such misappropriation,
fiduciary law imposes substantive prohibitions on the entrusted party
(the fiduciaries). Yet, even in this case, fiduciaries may engage in
prohibited activities if, and only if, they receive the consent of the
entrustors, after full disclosure. This exception converts the relationship
from a fiduciary to a contract relationship with respect to the transaction
that received the investor–saver’s consent.
With respect to the ownership of the money and third party promises,
intermediaries have ownership only to the extent necessary to perform
their services.3 If intermediaries use entrusted money and power for the
benefit of anyone (including their own) without the express permission
of the true beneficial owners, these intermediaries breach their duties.
In fact, they are embezzlers, regardless of the interpretation of the law.
In reality, they took what did not belong to them and broke the trust that
was placed in them.
Intermediaries are controlled by law to prevent embezzling entrusted
property and misusing entrusted power. The law is designed to induce
intermediaries to perform their services according to the reasonable
expectations and the needs of the investors and society.4
C. Disclosure: The Market Model
The same duality of contract on the one hand and imposed rules of
behavior on the other hand, appears in non-personal market relationships
2. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW Ch. 2 (2011).
3. See id. at 19; see also Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 809 (1983)
(“The power that the fiduciary obtains is originally vested in someone else, and is delegated to the
fiduciary not for his own use, but solely for the purpose of facilitating the performance of his
functions.”).
4. To be sure, such control depends among other things on (1) the nature of the services and
degree of entrustment, (2) the entrustors’ ability to exercise control, and (3) the alternative controlling
mechanisms such as public mores and pressures.
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as well. However, law changes the model of contract relationship.
Instead of leaving each party to seek information from the other, the law
imposes on the parties a duty to truthfully disclose relevant
information.5
Government agencies may act as the counter parties and surrogates of
the investors for this purpose.6 And when a transaction involves
products that require expertise, such as pharmaceutical products, the
government imposes testing and substantive duties on the producers
before they can offer the products in the markets. For experiments,
however, law reverts to a fiduciary model of full disclosure—contract.7
That is, so long as the information provided to the other party is
accessible and intelligible.8 When the subject matter of the relationship
is financial, a number of issues arise. At the outset, however, let us
define what is usually called “financial assets.” I maintain that the name
is misleading. Financial assets are a party’s promises to pay in the
future a sum of money for cash, such as the purchase of bonds, or for a
promise to pay more or less money in the future, depending on currently
unknown circumstances, such as the relationship underlying “swaps.”
In both cases, at least one of the subject matters of the relationship is
promises to pay. Arguably, this is a very usual subject matter of many
transactions in assets. The difference between the sale or purchase of
real assets and financial assets, however, is that the subject matter of the
purchase or sale in the financial area is a promise to pay in the future. It
is for this promise that the buyer pays.
Disclosure has become the main regulatory mechanism for the
securities markets. Disclosure offers two main benefits. First, it enables
investors to make their decisions on whether and how to trade in
securities (third party promises). Second, disclosure can deter issuers
and brokers from misleading investors.9 Publicity can deter fraud. The

5. Goodwin v. Aggasiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660–61 (Mass. 1933).
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006) (prohibiting sale of unregistered securities); id. § 77e(b)
(prohibiting prospectus not meeting requirements of Securities Act with regard to registered securities);
id. § 77e(c) (prohibiting offer of securities unless registration statement has been filed).
7. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 843–44 (Md. 2001) (finding
provisions of consent agreement “created contractual relationships imposing duties by reason of the
consent agreement themselves”).
8. Id. at 823–37, 848 (requiring clear disclosure).
9. See, e.g., LOUIS LOSS ET AL., 1 SECURITIES REGULATION 580 (4th ed. 2006) (stating that
“announced aim” of the 1933 Act “was to inform the investor of the facts concerning securities offered
for sale and to protect him against fraud and misrepresentation”); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
230 (1988) (“The 1934 Act was designed to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices.”)
(citing legislative history); id. (“There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity.”) (quoting
legislative history); id. (noting “fundamental purpose” of 1934 Act as “implementing a philosophy of
full disclosure”) (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977) (quoting SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963))).
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light of day (and perhaps the warmth of the sun) can be the effective
regulators.10 To be sure, this description is very general. However, for
the purpose of this Article, these high-level models may suffice.
III. THE TWO MAIN FORMS OF INTERMEDIATION, THEIR EVOLUTION AND
SUBSEQUENT MERGER
A. The Two Forms of Financial Intermediation
Developed societies have established financial intermediation
systems, that is, mechanisms that facilitate the transfer of money from
savers to borrowers. These mechanisms are financial intermediaries. A
history of financial intermediation demonstrates the emergence of two
fundamental forms: institutions and markets. Financial promises—I do
not call them assets, and instead describe them by what I consider a
more accurate description—are traded in markets. Markets in physical
products and necessities developed early on where sellers and buyers
would meet, sometimes periodically, such as in the establishment of
fairs.11 The fairs in financial promises were and are called today as well,
exchanges. But buyers and sellers rarely enter them. Rather, these fairs
are populated by intermediaries, who can connect buyers with sellers of
third party promises. Markets, however, require a number of conditions.
The third party promises must be standardized and in sufficient number
and appropriate amounts to attract an adequate number of brokers to
take on the intermediation task. In addition, markets must float
sufficient information about the third party promises to allay the fears of
the buyers of these promises that the promises will not be kept—the
buyers’ risks. For these risks, buyers receive rewards linked in part to
the levels of these risks.

10. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914) (“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most effective policeman.”),
quoted in LOUIS LOSS ET AL., 1 SECURITIES REGULATION 261 (4th ed. 2006). See also James R. Barth
& Joseph J. Cordes, Optimal Financial Disclosure with and Without SEC Regulation, 20 Q. REV. ECON.
& BUS. 30 (1980). Professors Barth and Cordes calculate the cost benefit of disclosure with or without
SEC regulation and conclude that “court costs” would render incentives to zero information. It is not
clear whether the writers considered possible misinformation. They view information as an asset for
which investors might pay more or less. The article contains nice charts.
11. See, e.g., Barnstaple, DEVON CNTY. COUNCIL, http://www.devon.gov.uk/historicbarnstaple
(last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (citing H.G. HOSKINS, DEVON (1954)) (noting Barnstaple’s economic
importance in medieval times; and that one weekly market was held for “vegetables and other farm
produce” and another was limited to “corn and cattle”).
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B. The Gold Merchants—Ancient Bank Model
In the past, market in gold, and perhaps other expensive assets, tended
to take the form of institutions. Perhaps the reason was linked to
physical security requirements, which were too costly to establish in a
market, and which would have involved more persons than those who
wished and could afford to buy.
Therefore, early on, goldsmiths received custody of clients’ gold,
other precious metals and precious stones. The purpose of the custody
was to create ornaments from these materials. Goldsmiths held their
clients’ gold and handed over receipts for the amounts they held. With
time, these clients paid other parties not with gold, but with the
goldsmiths’ receipts. Both parties preferred to deal with receipts rather
than with the metals. Thus, gold became a form of money through
institutional intermediaries—the goldsmiths. When goldsmiths found
that the clients did not demand all the gold their gold in species, the
goldsmiths began to sell more receipts for gold than the amount they
held, so long as they had a sufficient amount of gold to meet demand for
the species.12 Like today’s banks, the goldsmiths’ liabilities exceeded
their assets but matched the demand. Similarly, to meet the needs of
travelling merchants to foreign countries, the Lombards introduced in
England bills of exchange in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.13 In
time banks developed as an intermediation form. Banks borrowed
money and issued their own obligations (banknotes); then turned and
lent the money they borrowed to borrowers at a higher interest rate.
C. Markets
As noted, markets in third party promises cannot develop unless
certain conditions exist. First, the traded financial instruments must be
standardized. Second, there must be a sufficient number of such
financial instruments in denominations to attract a sufficient number of
traders. Third, there must be interested intermediaries—underwriters,
brokers, and dealers, and perhaps, with the growth of complex and
number of financial instruments, advisers.
If the conditions for markets do not exist, intermediation is carried on
by institutions. Institutions borrow from lenders on the lenders’ terms,
and then turn around and lend the proceeds of the lenders’ money to
borrowers on their own terms. Intermediaries in the markets usually live
12. See J. MILNES HOLDEN, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAW 206–
07 (1955) (noting role of goldsmiths in development of check system); id. at 70–73 (generally
describing goldsmiths’ notes).
13. Id. at 1–2.
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off a percentage of the amounts they trade, even though they currently
charge a fixed fee for the number of promises that they sell or buy at
different prices. In contrast, institutions live off the different risk level
of the promises they issue and the third party promises of the borrowers
to whom they lend. Thus, by definition, the risk levels of institutional
borrowing are lower than the risk level of the borrowers to whom they
transfer the promises.
D. The Changed Intermediation Scene in the United States
In 1933 Congress separated market and institutional intermediation
by the Glass–Steagall Act. Congress imposed tight controls on
institutional intermediaries, such as banks14 and mutual funds,15 and the
states have imposed similar controls on insurance companies.16
Historically, Congress treated market regulation by required disclosure.
State laws, which imposed government pricing on the first issuance of
securities, for example, have disappeared.17
During that period, the banks and the insurance companies were the
main intermediaries.18 Both institutions were not focused on market
intermediation. Insurance companies in the 1940s were usually owned
by the policy holders and received their funding from the policyholders.
It was only later, in the late 1950s, that insurance companies became
interested in both raising funds in the markets and offering securities
trading in the markets, that is variable annuities and variable insurance
financial intermediation.19
It was only in the 1980s that banks began to recognize the extent to
which markets have risen as intermediaries. It was in the 1980s that
bank regulators began to advocate for their banks to expand the banks’
functions to market activities. In both cases the markets began to “bite”
into the monopoly of the banks and insurance companies. In the case of
banks, the regulators began to strongly advocate opening the doors of
bank institutional intermediation to market intermediation. The courts

14. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 21–216d (2006) (governing national banks); id. §§ 221–522 (Federal
Reserve System).
15. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to a-64 (2006); Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to b-21 (2006).
16. See McCarran–Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006) (stating policy that state regulation of
insurance business is in public interest); MASS. GEN. LAWS chs. 175–175K (2011) (Massachusetts
insurance statutes).
17. See, e.g., Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 471, 471 (1993)
(noting that “[m]ajor states have abandoned their commitment to merit regulation”).
18. See supra Part II.
19. See Tamar Frankel, Variable Annuities,Variable Insurance and Separate Accounts, 51 BYU
L. REV. 177 (1971).
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of the 1960s denied the roundabout ways of such door-opening. The
courts of the 1980s and the regulators pressed hard for the doors to be
opened. In 1996, the pressure gave way, and Congress eliminated the
separation of market and institutional intermediation altogether.20
Therefore thereafter, disclosure took second seat to substantive
regulation. The focus on disclosure has risen with the rise of markets.
The financial markets changed after the 1929 crash. Markets were no
longer the main intermediation channels.
Rather the main
intermediaries were banks, insurance companies, and later in the 1970s,
investment companies. This hegemony, however, began to weaken. In
the 1950s, the market segment of intermediation began to encroach on
institutional intermediation and occupy an increasingly larger part of the
intermediation business.
As this market pressure developed, banks and their regulators, as well
as some insurance companies, began to press for a greater role in market
intermediation. This pressure culminated in the effective overturning of
the Glass–Steagall Act by Congress in 1996. Thus, today, there are
large financial intermediaries that function as banks, brokers, dealers
and mutual funds.
Today their intermediation functions are performed by financial
intermediaries that serve not only intermediation, but the creation of
new types of financial promises. One type of such promises converts
individual promises, such as loans, into marketable promises such as
securities. Another type separates promises of borrowers from the risk
that they pose and offers a market in risks from promises. In addition,
there are pools of such promises that promise payments depending on
the performance of the underlying promises.
IV. THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE IN THE TWO MAIN FORMS OF
INTERMEDIATION IN OUR FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
A. Disclosure in Traditional Institutional and Market Intermediation
The role of disclosure in traditional institutional intermediation and
market intermediation differs significantly. It was recognized that the
possible failure and problems that arise in institutional intermediation
cannot be resolved by disclosure to the lenders, such as bank depositors.
Institutional intermediaries may fail if the demand for the money they
borrowed exceeds the amount of liquid assets they carry. Their
managements may consume current assets in the hope of making up the

20. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 § 101(a) (1999) (repealing
12 U.S.C. § 377 (1935)).
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difference to cover long term assets. The disparity between their assets
and liabilities creates both risk and incentives for managers to take
greater risks with long-term assets.
Two solutions were employed to address these problems. One was
substantive regulation and the other—government backup to avoid
“runs.” This was the solution for banks and credit unions and alike, as
well as for insurance companies.
The other solution was to
substantively regulate banks and insurance companies’ operations, and
impose fiduciary duties and disclosure requirements on investment
companies. In addition, the most successful investment companies of
the “open end” species are required to offer investors an escape by
redemption—receiving their money after a fairly short notice and a
system of evaluation. In that sense, open end companies are very
similar to banks’ offering of demand deposits.
B. Disclosure in Market Intermediation
Disclosure in market intermediation is fundamentally different from
controls of institutional intermediation. This disclosure is grounded in
the image of a contract offered to the public. The regulator, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, represents the public by requiring
the issuer of financial securities to make not only substantive disclosure,
but also asking the issuer to revise such disclosure for clarification
accompanied by criminal and civil sanctions on misinformation.21
We noted that bank regulation is based on substantive regulation both
in terms of how to manage the borrowing and investments of the
public’s money, and investment company regulation is based on
disclosure and fiduciary duties imposed on money managers. The
merger of the two forms—institutions and markets intermediation—
brought about the heightened emphasis on disclosure in all forms of
intermediation in our financial system. It brought together the different
regulatory regimes to which the institutions are subject, and the
incompatible role of disclosure in each of these institutions. Their
culture, which was governed by directives or fiduciary law on how to

21. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006) (prohibiting sale of unregistered securities); id. § 77e(b)
(prohibiting prospectus not meeting requirements of Securities Act with regard to registered securities);
id. § 77e(c) (prohibiting offer of securities unless registration statement has been filed); LOUIS LOSS ET
AL., 1 SECURITIES REGULATION 813–19 (4th ed. 2006) (if a registration statement is not acceptable, the
staff generally drafts a comment letter, and the registrant generally drafts an appropriate amendment);
15 U.S.C. § 77x (2006) (providing for penalties for violations of 1933 Act); id. § 78ff (2006) (providing
for penalties for violations of 1934 Act).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013

11

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2

432

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81

manage other people’s money, has been watered down to disclosure.22
C. Disclosure is Less Specific than Rules
There is an extensive discussion among academics with respect to the
value and consequences of required disclosure including the history of
the requirement. Cost is a big issue. Cost focuses on the cost to the
institutions rather than the cost to the investors. There are arguments
that those who are adversely affected by disclosure may find ways
around it. Some predictions suggest that disclosure may bring about
results that are worse than mere silence. Market enforcement, including
the information contained in the price, may be far better than disclosure
by regulation and may be weakened by government action. Thus,
disclosure may impair information that the law required to disseminate
to the public.23 There is copious literature, especially in behavioral
economics, on the usefulness and effect of disclosure to investors. It has
been shown that investors do not read the disclosed information,24 and
that often they do not make rational investment decisions.25 Therefore,
information is hardly effective and sometimes defective.
Disclosure is also emasculated with the speed of trading. As huge
amounts of money are transferred at a blink of an eye disclosure loses
much of its regulatory power. It is a promise to behave in a certain
way, but may be harder to verify the true behavior.
We have gone a long way in trading in promises. On the way, we lost
the identity of who promises, and sometimes also what is the
underlying-pooled-promise. Effective diversification has made it hard
and often impossible to retrieve the underlying information about the
first, second, and other tiers of promisors and the promisors who
supported these promises.

22. See Jeffrey D. Bauman, Loss and Seligman on Securities Regulation: An Essay for Don
Schwartz, 78 GEO. L.J. 1753 (1990) (reviewing LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION (3rd ed. 1969)).
23. See Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of
Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473 (2007); see also Allison M. Snyder, Survey: Holding Multinational
Corporations Accountable: Is Non-Financial Disclosure the Answer?, COLUM. BUS. L. REV, 2007, at.
565 (describing the policy arguments on mandatory disclosures).
24. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 682
(1996) (“[A]necdotal evidence, supported by many people’s assumptions about investment practices,
indicates that most nonprofessional investors do not read the prospectuses and other legal disclosure
documents they are given.”) (citing Homer Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 BUS. LAW.
631 (1973)).
25. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 148–56 (2d ed. 2005) (suggesting
that investors have “limited abilities and certain natural modes of behavior”); id. at 157–75 (suggesting
social influence on judgment).
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Disclosure of the creative promises of both institutional and market
intermediaries emasculated disclosure and made their method of these
promises to the investors ineffective.
Investors trusted the
intermediaries, were fired up by the sales talk of intermediaries, and
were stumped by the enormous and detailed disclosure as well as the
“bespeaks caution” detractions of the promises.
Disclosure is a waiting method. It is difficult to check whether the
disclosed promise has been performed. Saying, “I will do such and such
tomorrow” does not mean, “I have done it yesterday.” In the meantime
a violation of the promise can mature into a profitable habit, “This is the
way we do things, and look how successful we have become.” A habit
of a wrongful act becomes a habit of a justifiable act, especially if it is
profitable. Thus, when the fraud or harmful behavior has been
discovered after a few years, not only are there justifications for the
habit, but also strong resistance. The resistance to the disclosure of
conflict of interests demonstrated by broker dealers serves as an
example.
It is unclear whether habits that developed during the rise of
“subprime” mortgage backed securities can be uprooted easily, even if
the perpetrating entities are required to pay millions in retribution.26
First, entities are not people. The real perpetrators may have filled their
pockets and left. Second, the culture of the entity remains and is hard to
change. Someone might sigh remembering the good old days and
newcomers may sigh, hoping for the return of those days. One fact does
loom large. In the past two to three years, most of the managers of the
large financial intermediaries have left and been replaced by a new
generation. This generation has inherited problems, and it is not clear
how it views both itself and its mission. 27 In addition, the threat of
strict enforcement and punishment in the case of untrue disclosure might
lead to “protective disclosure.” An example of such a disclosure by
Bank of America in the third quarter of 2011 follows and speaks for
itself: With the disclosure of future evaluations by financial institutions
came disclaimers by the yards.28 One such disclaimer is attached in
Appendix A to this Article.

26. Jean Eaglesham, Mortgage-Bond Deal Draws a Fine, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29. 2012, at C2.
Note the cases against insider traders after years of quiet on this front. See Jenny Strasburg & Reed
Albergotti, Insider Targets Expanding, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2012, at A1, A2.
27. See Francesco Guerrera, Wall Street Chiefs Set a New Agenda, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2012, at
C1.
28. See supra Part II.
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D. Disclosure in Fiduciary Law
The situation both before the 1929 crash and thereafter led to a quest
for professional advice. It appeared in the form of newspapers, advisory
news, and advice in more personal contact. Advisers are fiduciaries in
the sense that their advice must be entirely focused on the benefit for the
advisees, and any conflict of interest that taints their advice must be
disclosed. After such disclosure, the advisee can determine whether to
rely on the adviser or seek another one.
In the 1940s the regulation of advisers–fiduciaries was not strict, and
the Advisers Act of 1940 had little “bite” in it.29 Therefore, disclosure
of fiduciaries regarding their conflicts of interests was not the focus of
financial system regulation. And, as noted, the markets were not the
main financial intermediaries of the 1940s.
An additional reason for the relaxed treatment by intermediaries
applies particularly to banks and their regulators. For example, a
golden rule of trust law is that trustees may not mingle their own
money with the beneficiaries’ money. Trustees may sometimes
mingle beneficiaries’ money but never the beneficiaries’ money with
their own. It turns out that the banking regulators allowed banks to
insert banks’ assets into customers’ accounts. When MF Global
Holdings became bankrupt, approximately $1.6 billion was found
missing. In an attempt to find where the money was, employees and
investigators found that $165 million of customers’ money had been
transferred from customers’ accounts to the company’s account, in a
moment’s notice and a few moments-transfer. It may have been a
mistake, but that mistake could not have happened had not the
banking regulation allowed the company to mix its money together
with the customers’ money in the customers’ account. The
explanation for this regulatory permission was “in part to provide
ease of trading for those customers.”30 Regulators who are more
concerned about the “efficient operation” of the companies and have
no concern about the customers’ money are in fact at the service of
the financial intermediaries. Most interesting was the reaction of the
regulators to this debacle: “Regulators and industry groups are
working on possible changes to rules aimed at preventing a shortfall
in client money. On Wednesday the Futures Industry Association
called for more disclosure on handling of customer money.”31 More

29. TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, 1 THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS
§ 1.02[A][1], at 1–37 (2001 & Supp. 2002) (citing Note, The Regulation of Investment Advisers, 14
STAN. L. REV. 827 (1962)).
30. Julie Steinberg et al., Fast, Furious at MF Global, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2012, at C1.
31. Id.
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disclosure indeed! Let no investors rely on protection from them.
V. THE FAILURE OF DISCLOSURE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION: ASK NOT
WHAT YOU BUY BUT WHO IS SELLING TO YOU
The last thirty years have seen not only a movement from institutions
to markets; they have also seen two accompanying developments: the
movement from substantive regulation to disclosure, and the rise of
market advisory services based on disclosure rather than on fiduciary
rules. These trends denote reduced substantive regulation and increased
reliance on disclosure—the contract model.
However, disclosure presents an increasingly serious problem. The
roots of the problem are embedded in two other developments. As
promises and institutional structures have become increasingly complex,
so did disclosure about the promises that the institutions design or offer.
Most humans have great difficulty in calculating complexity. They
simplify complex materials in order to absorb and understand their
meaning and make decisions. Sheena Iyengar is the psychologist
responsible for the famous jam experiment:
At a luxury food store in Menlo Park, [CA] researchers set up a table
offering samples of jam. Sometimes, there were six different flavors to
choose from. At other times, there were 24. (In both cases, popular
flavors like strawberry were left out.) Shoppers were more likely to stop
by the table with more flavors. But after the taste test, those who chose
from the smaller number were 10 times more likely to actually buy jam:
30 percent versus 3 percent. Having too many options, it seems, made it
harder to settle on a single selection.32

Judicial approach of “bespeaks caution” adds to dilute the value of
disclosure. It has undermined the substance of promises, which by
definition relate to the future performance and the disclosure of these
promises as well. Most importantly, disclosure documents have become
bulky and unreadable to the untutored eye, as seen in the Bank of
America statement.33
The reason for this type of disclosure is not hard to find. Disclosure
pursuant to regulation carries with it penalties for misleading statements.
Factual statements are more vulnerable than future and less factual
statements. Consequently, many investors do not read the disclosure
documents; many others who do read do not understand their meaning.
The main issue is efficiency. The longer it takes to research and read
the documents, the harder it is to understand them, the more inclined

32. Virginia Postrel, Indecision-Making, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2010, at BR.
33. See infra Appendix A.
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investors are to rely on others for a shorter, simpler, and more
understandable message.
It is therefore not surprising that investors seek experts for directions
on what to buy, sell, or hold. They follow advisory letters, advisers, and
brokers. It is not surprising that broker–dealers seek to offer investors
advice about investment choices.34 Even though the Advisers Act of
1940 has become more robust and specific, the status of broker–dealers
as fiduciaries is being argued now and diluted.35
Since 1934, brokers were subject to a number of regulations. They
were required to offer investors prospectuses or other documents
relating to the securities (financial promises) that the investors would
buy;36 and provide their investors with the “best execution” of the
investors’ orders.37 In addition brokers may advise their clients on the
choice of their investments, provided their advice was “suitable” to the
clients’ situation. However, “suitability” and their other brokers’
regulation skirt around the brokers’ duties as fiduciaries.
Brokers are not required to avoid conflicts of interests while they
advise investors. They are not required to disclose to investors any
34. Certain Broker–Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424,
20,425 (Apr. 19, 2005).
35. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act)
empowered the SEC to require broker–dealers and investment advisers, when providing personalized
investment advice about securities to retail customers, “to act in the best interest of the customer”
without regard to the interest of the broker–dealer or adviser, and such standard must generally be as
stringent as that applicable to investment advisers under sections 206(1)-(2) of the Advisers Act. Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(g)(2), 124 Stat.
1376 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(g) (2010)); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1), (2) (2006). The Dodd–Frank Act
also empowered the SEC to provide a standard of conduct for broker–dealers, when providing
personalized investment advice about securities to retail customers, that is the same as that applicable to
an investment adviser under section 211 of the Advisers Act. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(g)(1), 124
Stat. 1376 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(k)(1) (2010)); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11 (2006). The Dodd–Frank Act
also required the SEC to conduct a study to evaluate the effectiveness of existing standards of care for
broker–dealers and investment advisers regarding personalized investment advice and recommendations
about securities to retail customers. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78o (2010)). The study must also evaluate whether there are “gaps, shortcomings, or overlaps”
in such standards that should be addressed. Id. § 913(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o
(2010)). The SEC must also consider other issues including (1) whether retail customers understand the
different standards of care applicable to broker–dealers and investment advisers; (2) the impact on retail
customers of imposing on broker–dealers the standard of care of investment advisers and/or other
Advisers Act requirements; and (3) the impact on retail customers of eliminating the broker–dealer
exclusion from the Advisers Act. Id. § 913(c), 124 Stat. 1376 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2010)). In
the study, the staff noted retail investor confusion between broker–dealers and advisers and their
standards of care, and prepared recommendations including a uniform fiduciary standard for advisers
and broker–dealers for personalized investment advice about securities to retail customers. U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER–DEALERS v–viii (2011), available at
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006) (amended 2010).
37. Id.
at
Rule
5310,
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=10455.
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conflicting interests that the brokers might have in connection with their
advice-sales talk. Therefore, disclosure is required with respect to what
is being sold. Disclosure is not required with respect to who is the
person who gives the advice, what are the adviser–broker’s interests in
the transaction, and whether these interests conflict with the interests of
the investors.
For example, brokers need not disclose to their customers that they
are recommending more expensive third party promises involving more
expensive management fees, or limiting the investors’ choices to those
that the brokers are required by their organization’s management to sell.
Brokers are not required, and sometimes cannot explain to investors
what the third party promises that they offer mean and what the possible
consequences of buying these promises could be. In short, no risk must
be disclosed. The “suitability” of the investment for the customer is
determined by the broker, but there is no need to disclose to the
customer the considerations that lead to the finding of “suitability.”
Therefore, the first type of disclosure—relating to what is being
sold—must be disclosed. The second type of disclosure—regarding
who the seller is, and any conflicts of interests that the seller might have
with respect to the seller’s advice—need not be disclosed. Sales talk,
even though it contains phrases such as “trust me” and “I have
experienced the same and bought the same” or “my entire family
invested in this stock” or “we know the price will rise very soon” or
“look at all the millions that other investors in the stock have collected”
can be taken as advice. It should be emphasized that investors do not
easily quantify their transaction costs, including the costs that their
brokers might impose on them. These costs, however, may be quite
high with the longevity of the investments.
I conclude that investors today are as vulnerable as they were in the
1920s. Their banks are no longer banks, but market traders. Their
market traders are no longer mere brokers, but also advisers. Investors
hand over their money and rely on the banks and their brokers, both of
whom are not fiduciaries. Moreover, banks and brokers are regulated
mostly as sales intermediaries. They are only required to disclose to
investors the promises that they sell them. The salespersons and sales
institutions may bask in the warmth of the conflicts of interests that
investors are not aware of. Therefore, investors are unable to determine
whether to engage such intermediaries and whether to rely on their
advice.
The financial intermediation system is broken. That is because
investors do not trust it, and quite rightly so. Regulation might not be
effective so long as the brokerage and other intermediation
organizations are fighting their fiduciary duties concerning other
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peoples’ money. A law which they strongly resist will not work well,
even if passed. The drive to repeal it is likely to continue.
The financial system will not mend until a new type of rule
enforcement is introduced and unless investors change their focus and
attitude. Instead of asking or listening to the marvelous investments that
they are offered, investors should focus on the market intermediaries,
including: the banks, the registered brokers, the unregistered brokers,
and anyone else who offers “promises” for sale.
Before investors meet potential intermediaries face to face, investors
should inquire and receive from intermediaries a simple signed
informational form.38
This form should provide investors with
information about the intermediaries: who are the intermediaries, what
their background and expertise are, whether the intermediaries’ interests
might conflict with those of the potential clients, and similar information
that would help investors determine the level of the intermediaries’
trustworthiness. Investors should focus first on the intermediaries’
reliability as advisers, and only then on what the intermediaries offer. To
the extent that Congress and the regulators do not protect (or perhaps
cannot protect) investors, the investors should take steps to protect
themselves and in many cases they can.

APPENDIX
A. BofA Third-Quarter 2011 Disclaimer:
Bank of America and its management may make certain statements that
constitute “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These statements can
be identified by the fact that they do not relate strictly to historical or
current facts. Forward-looking statements often use words such as
“anticipates,” “targets,” “expects,” “estimates,” “intends,” “plans,”
“goals,” “believes” and other similar expressions or future or
conditional verbs such as “will,” “should,” “would” and “could.” The
forward-looking statements made represent Bank of America’s current
expectations, plans or forecasts of its future results and revenues, the
company’s building of a fortress balance sheet; the implementation and
completion of, and expected impact from, Project New BAC, including
estimated expense reductions; the pending sale of the company’s
Canadian credit card business; the nationwide launch of Customer
Solutions; plans to hire more than 1,000 small business bankers by early

38. E.g.,
SEC,
FORM
ADV
(2011),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/iard/iastuff.shtml (under the investment Advisers Act of 1940).
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2012; implementation of a customer-focused strategy to position the
company for long-term growth; plans to exit the Home Loans
correspondent mortgage lending channel and focus on retail
distribution of mortgage products and services; the estimated range of
possible loss for non-GSE representations and warranties exposure;
representations and warranties reserves, expenses and repurchase
activity; and other similar matters. These statements are not guarantees
of future results or performance and involve certain risks, uncertainties
and assumptions that are difficult to predict and are often beyond Bank
of America’s control. Actual outcomes and results may differ materially
from those expressed in, or implied by, any of these forward-looking
statements.
You should not place undue reliance on any forward-looking
statement and should consider all of the following uncertainties and
risks, as well as those more fully discussed under Item 1A. “Risk
Factors” of Bank of America’s 2010 Annual Report on Form 10-K and
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30,
2011 and in any of Bank of America’s subsequent SEC filings: the
company’s ability to implement, manage and realize the anticipated
benefits and expense savings from Project New BAC; the company’s
timing and determinations regarding any potential revised
comprehensive capital plan submission and the Federal Reserve
Board’s response; the company’s intent to build capital through
retaining earnings, reducing legacy asset portfolios and implementing
other non-dilutive capital related initiatives; the accuracy and
variability of estimates and assumptions in determining the expected
total cost to Bank of America of the recent private label securitization
settlement (the settlement) with The Bank of New York Mellon (BNY
Mellon); the accuracy and variability of estimates and assumptions in
determining the estimated liability and/or estimated range of possible
loss for representation and warranties exposures to the GSEs,
monolines and private label and other investors; the accuracy and
variability of estimates and assumptions in determining the portion of
Bank of America’s repurchase obligations for residential mortgage
obligations sold by Bank of America and its affiliates to investors that
has been paid or reserved after giving effect to the settlement agreement
with BNY Mellon (the settlement agreement) and the charges in the
quarter ended June 30, 2011; the possibility that objections to the
settlement, including substantial objections already filed, will delay or
prevent receipt of final court approval; whether the conditions to the
settlement will be satisfied, including the receipt of final court approval
and private letter rulings from the IRS and other tax rulings and
opinions; whether conditions in the settlement agreement that would
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permit Bank of America and legacy Countrywide to withdraw from the
settlement will occur and whether Bank of America and legacy
Countrywide will determine to withdraw from the settlement pursuant to
the terms of the settlement agreement; the impact of performance and
enforcement of obligations under, and provisions contained in, the
settlement agreement and the institutional investor agreement, including
performance of obligations under the settlement agreement by Bank of
America (and certain of its affiliates) and the trustee and the
performance of obligations under the institutional investor agreement by
Bank of America (and certain of its affiliates) and the investor group;
Bank of America’s and certain of its affiliates’ ability to comply with the
servicing and documentation obligations under the settlement
agreement; the potential assertion and impact of additional claims not
addressed by the settlement agreement or any of the prior agreements
entered into between Bank of America (and/or certain of its affiliates)
and the GSEs, monoline insurers and other investors;the company’s
resolution of certain representations and warranties obligations with the
GSEs and ability to resolve any remaining claims; the company’s ability
to resolve any representations and warranties obligations with
monolines and private investors; increased repurchase claims and
repurchases due to mortgage insurance cancellations, rescissions and
denials; the company’s failure to satisfy its obligations as servicer in the
residential mortgage securitization process; the foreclosure review and
assessment process, the effectiveness of the company’s response to such
process and any governmental or private third-party claims asserted in
connection with these foreclosure matters; the risk of a credit rating
downgrade of the U.S. government by one of the other major credit
rating agencies in addition to the downgrade from Standard & Poor’s in
August 2011; the risk that Standard & Poor’s will further downgrade
the U.S. government’s credit rating; negative economic conditions
generally including continued weakness in the U.S. housing market,
high unemployment in the U.S., as well as economic challenges in many
non-U.S. countries in which we operate; the impact resulting from
international and domestic sovereign credit uncertainties, including the
current challenges facing European economies; the company’s credit
ratings and the credit ratings of its securitizations, including the risk
that the company or its securities will be the subject of additional or
further credit rating downgrades in addition to the downgrade by
Moody’s in the third quarter of 2011; the company’s mortgage
modification policies, loss mitigation strategies and related results; and
any measures or steps taken by federal regulators or other
governmental authorities with regard to mortgage loans, servicing
agreements and standards, or other matters; the level and volatility of
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the capital markets, interest rates, currency values and other market
indices; changes in consumer, investor and counterparty confidence in,
and the related impact on, financial markets and institutions, including
the company as well as its business partners; the accuracy and
variability of estimates of the fair value of certain of the company’s
assets and liabilities; legislative and regulatory actions in the U.S.
(including the impact of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (the Financial Reform Act), the Electronic
Fund Transfer Act, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and
Disclosure Act and related regulations and interpretations) and
internationally; the identification and effectiveness of any initiatives to
mitigate the negative impact of the Financial Reform Act; the impact of
litigation and regulatory investigations, including costs, expenses,
settlements and judgments as well as any collateral effects on its ability
to do business and access the capital markets; the ability to achieve
resolution in negotiations with law enforcement authorities and federal
agencies, including the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, involving mortgage
servicing practices, including the timing and any settlement terms;
various monetary, tax and fiscal policies and regulations of the U.S. and
non-U.S. governments; changes in accounting standards, rules and
interpretations (including new consolidation guidance), inaccurate
estimates or assumptions in the application of accounting policies,
including in determining reserves, applicable guidance regarding
goodwill accounting and the impact on the Company’s financial
statements.
Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made,
and Bank of America undertakes no obligation to update any forwardlooking statement to reflect the impact of circumstances or events that
arise after the date the forward-looking statement was made.
B. Bank of America First Quarter 2011 Disclaimer
Forward-Looking Statements
Bank of America and its management may make certain statements
that constitute “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These statements are
not historical facts, but instead represent Bank of America’s current
expectations, plans or forecasts of its future results and revenues,
including net interest income, credit trends, including credit losses,
credit reserves, charge-offs and nonperforming asset levels, consumer
and commercial service charges, including the impact of changes in the
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company’s overdraft policy liquidity, regulatory and GAAP capital
levels, revenue impact of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility
and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act), the closing of the First
Republic Bank and Columbia Management sales, the impact of higher
interest rates on the balance sheet and other similar matters. These
statements are not guarantees of future results or performance and
involve certain risks, uncertainties and assumptions that are difficult to
predict and are often beyond Bank of America’s control. Actual
outcomes and results may differ materially from those expressed in, or
implied by, any of these forward-looking statements.
You should not place undue reliance on any forward-looking
statement and should consider all of the following uncertainties and
risks, as well as those more fully discussed under Item 1A. “Risk
Factors” of Bank of America’s 2009 Annual Report on Form 10-K and
in any of Bank of America’s subsequent SEC filings: negative economic
conditions that adversely affect the general economy, housing prices,
the job market, consumer confidence and spending habits; Bank of
America’s modification policies and related results; the level and
volatility of the capital markets, interest rates, currency values and
other market indices; changes in consumer, investor and counterparty
confidence in, and the related impact on, financial markets and
institutions; Bank of America’s credit ratings and the credit ratings of
its securitizations; estimates of fair value of certain Bank of America
assets and liabilities; legislative and regulatory actions in the United
States (including the impact of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, the
CARD Act of 2009 and related regulations) and internationally; the
impact of litigation and regulatory investigations, including costs,
expenses, settlements and judgments; various monetary and fiscal
policies and regulations of the U.S. and non-U.S. governments; changes
in accounting standards, rules and interpretations (including the new
accounting guidance on consolidation) and the impact on Bank of
America’s financial statements; increased globalization of the financial
services industry and competition with other U.S. and international
financial institutions; Bank of America’s ability to attract new
employees and retain and motivate existing employees; mergers and
acquisitions and their integration into Bank of America; Bank of
America’s reputation; and decisions to downsize, sell or close units or
otherwise change the business mix of Bank of America. Forwardlooking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and Bank of
America undertakes no obligation to update any forward-looking
statement to reflect the impact of circumstances or events that arise
after the date the forward-looking statement was made.
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